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This working paper forms part of the CBR Research Programme on Corporate 
Governance. Abstract 
This review paper is a contribution to a symposium on the 'Future of Secured 
Credit in Europe'. Its theme is the way in which empirical research has shed 
light on earlier theoretical literature. These findings tend to suggest that the 
legal institution of secured credit is, on the whole, socially beneficial, and that 
such benefits are likely to outweigh any associated social costs. Having made 
this general claim, the paper then turns to consider the effects of four particular 
dimensions across which systems of secured credit may differ, and which may 
therefore be of interest to European law-makers. These are: (i) the scope of 
permissible  collateral;  (ii)  the  efficacy  of  enforcement;  (iii)  the  priority 
treatment of secured creditors; and (iv) the mechanisms employed to assist third 
parties in discovering that security has been granted. In each case, consideration 
is paid first to the theoretical position, and then empirical findings. It is argued 
that  perhaps  the  most  difficult  of  these  issues  for  European  law-makers 
concerns the appropriate design of publicity mechanisms for third parties.  
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1. Introduction 
The desirability of secured lending was extensively debated in the early law and 
economics literature. On the one hand, it was argued that secured credit helped 
to mitigate problems flowing from information asymmetries in credit markets, 
and  thereby  facilitated  the  provision  of  debt  finance  to  borrowers.  Others, 
however, took a less benign view of the institution of secured credit, arguing 
that  could  facilitate  the  redistribution  of  wealth  away  from  those  unable  to 
adjust the terms on which they advanced credit. This would be undesirable not 
only on distributional grounds, but on efficiency grounds as well: deadweight 
costs would be incurred by the excessive grant of secured credit in order to 
bring about such redistribution.  
 
This literature has, in the eyes of many legal scholars and practitioners, lacked 
persuasive force because of its apparent divorce from reality. This criticism was 
famously articulated by Homer Kripke, who wrote in 1985 that contributions to 
the  law  and  economics  literature  were,  ‘notable  for  their  use  entirely  of 
examples with assumed facts ... and for the absence of any attempt to determine 
whether these factual assumptions are typical of real world events’.
1 This type 
of criticism became a slogan under which many dismissed economic analysis as 
irrelevant  to  legal  scholarship.  However,  in  the  interim,  law  and  economics 
scholars have heeded Kripke’s call for more empirical research.
2 A growing 
empirical literature now exists on the use of secured credit, and the impact of 
changing laws that facilitate it. This paper reviews the empirical literature and 
argues that the findings tend to suggest that secured credit is, on the whole, 
socially  beneficial,  and  that  such  benefits  are  highly  likely  to  outweigh  the 
social costs of any transactions motivated by redistribution.  
 
Having made this general claim, this essay then turns to consider the effects of 
four particular dimensions across which systems of secured credit may differ, 
and which may therefore be of interest to European law-makers. These are: (i) 
the scope of permissible collateral; (ii) the efficacy of enforcement; (iii) the 
priority treatment of secured creditors; and (iv) the mechanisms employed to 
assist third parties in discovering that security has been granted. In each case, 
we  will  consider  first  the  theoretical  position,  and  then  discuss  empirical 
findings.  In  conclusion,  it  is  argued  that  perhaps  the  most  difficult  of  these 
issues for European law-makers concerns the appropriate design of publicity 
mechanisms for third parties. 
 
2. General theories of secured credit 
2.1 What does secured credit do? 
The grant of a security interest may be understood from a functional perspective 
as conferring upon the lender two sets of entitlements, which relate respectively   2 
to priority of payment and to control of the collateral.
3 The control rights are 
what economists call ‘state contingent’, because their extent is contingent on 
whether the debtor continues to meet their obligations under the loan.
4 Provided 
the debtor is not in default, the secured creditor’s control is of a purely negative 
variety, consisting of the ability to veto sales of the collateral. If the debtor is in 
default, then the secured creditor has a positive right (subject to any procedural 
restrictions  imposed  by  insolvency  law)
5  to  control  the  liquidation  of  the 
collateral. Moreover, the secured creditor is entitled to priority of repayment out 
of the proceeds of sale of the collateral.  
 
From the point of view of the secured creditor, a grant of security lowers default 
risk. All other things being equal, a creditor may therefore be expected to offer a 
debtor more advantageous terms—for example, a reduced interest rate—when 
lending on a secured than an unsecured basis. However, the priority accorded to 
a  secured  creditor  means  that  unsecured  creditors  will  now  fare  worse  in 
insolvency.  They  may  therefore  be  expected  to  demand  terms  that  are 
correspondingly less advantageous for the debtor—for example, an increased 
interest rate. From the debtor’s point of view, these adjustments in borrowing 
terms might be expected, in markets in which creditors adjust perfectly to the 
risks they undertake, to cancel each other out.
6 Moreover, a grant of secured 
credit creates costs for the debtor—in terms of restrictions over alienation of 
assets—that are not present in an unsecured borrowing arrangement. The early 
literature  on  secured  credit  viewed  these  stylised  facts  as  giving  rise  to  a 
‘puzzle’ over why debtors grant security: if the effect of security on a debtor’s 
aggregate cost of capital is neutral (secured creditors reduce rates, unsecured 
creditors increase them), and there are costs to the debtor associated with a grant 
of security, why bother?
7  
 
Various theories were advanced to explain why debtors might nevertheless be 
motivated  to  offer  security  to  their  creditors.  These  fall  into  two  broad 
categories. ‘Efficiency’ theories of secured credit suggest that its use generates 
benefits not present in an all-unsecured capital structure, such that the total cost 
of credit goes down. ‘Redistributive’ theories, on the other hand, suggest that a 
reduced overall cost of credit is obtained at the expense of creditors who do not 
adjust their terms to reflect the fact that a grant of security has reduced the 
expected  value  of  their  claims.  We  will  now  briefly  review  each  of  these 
theories.  
 
2.2 Security and signalling 
Two  principal  theories—with  diametrically  opposed  empirical  predictions—
were advanced to suggest that security interests could enhance  efficiency in 
credit  markets  characterised  by  asymmetric  information.
8  The  first,  the   3 
‘signalling’  theory,  viewed  security  as  a  ‘hostage’  offered  by  a  debtor  to  a 
creditor  to  demonstrate  the  seriousness  of  the  debtor’s  commitment  to 
repayment.
9  If  security  is  something  that  would  be  more  costly  for  a  ‘low-
quality’ borrower to offer than a ‘high-quality’ borrower, then willingness to 
offer  it  can  be  a  credible  signal  of  quality.  In  a  market  characterised  by 
asymmetric  information,  the  ability  to  use  a  signal  can  assist  creditors  in 
reducing  their  costs  of  screening  potential  borrowers.  The  prediction  of  the 
signalling theory is therefore that more creditworthy borrowers will be more 
willing  to  offer  security.  This  is,  however,  contrary  to  available  empirical 
evidence on the use of security, which finds that it tends to be granted more 




The problem with the application of signalling theory to secured credit lies in a 
simplistic interpretation of the cost of granting security. It is assumed that a 
grant of security is costly for a debtor, because the debtor runs the risk of losing 
the collateral, and that this cost is greater (in expected value terms) for a less 
creditworthy debtor, because the risk of losing the collateral is greater. But from 
the debtor’s point of view, there is no difference in the consequences of default 
as between secured and unsecured borrowing: in either case, the debtor’s assets 
will be seized by creditors. The benefit of being a secured creditor under such 
circumstances  is  not  vis-à-vis  the  debtor,  but  against  other  creditors—the 
secured  creditor  has  priority  as  regards  repayment.  The  difference  between 
secured and unsecured borrowing, as perceived by the debtor, will rather be felt 
in  states  of  the  world  in  which  default  does  not  occur.  Secured  borrowing 
involves giving creditors rights to control the alienation of assets that are not 
present in unsecured lending. This means that the marginal cost to the debtor of 
granting security, as opposed to borrowing unsecured, is therefore decreasing 
with the probability of default, because the ‘cost’ is only incurred so long as the 
debtor does not default.
11 In other words, the early application of the signalling 
model in the literature was mis-specified, deriving the inverse prediction. In 
fact,  properly  specified,  willingness  on  the  debtor’s  part  may  actually  be  a 
signal of lack of quality.
12 
 
2.3 Security and monitoring and bonding 
A second theory posits social benefits from the use of secured credit as a means 
of preventing debtors from engaging in acts harmful to creditors’ interests.
13 
Security is thought to be able to assist creditors in lowering ‘financial agency 
costs’;  that  is,  the  costs  of  conflicts  of  interest  between  shareholders  and 
creditors.
14 For example, if the business is financially distressed, shareholders—
or managers acting on their behalf—may have incentives to pursue highly risky 
strategies that actually have a negative net present value, simply because they   4 
stand  to  benefit  from  the  upside  in  the  unlikely  event  that  the  strategy  is 
successful. By restricting the ability of a debtor to alienate collateral, security 
enables the creditor to prevent the debtor from selling assets of stable value to 
fund more risky business ventures. Security also restricts the debtor’s ability to 
borrow to fund such ventures. By granting existing lenders priority to the firm’s 
assets, security forces new lenders to look primarily to the value generated by 
the ventures they fund, and thereby to scrutinise more carefully the purposes for 
which the debtor is borrowing.
15  
 
On the agency costs view, the grant of security is thus a bond by the debtor not 
to  engage  in  wealth-reducing  transactions.
16  Such  a  bond  is  valuable  to  the 
debtor, because by ‘tying its hands’ to prevent itself entering such transactions 
ex post, it increases its borrowing capacity ex ante.
17 This theory views security 
as  closely  related  in  function  to  loan  covenants  and  contractual  priority 
arrangements, which also impose restrictions on the debtor’s freedom of action 
that may be justified as bonds against wealth-reducing transactions.
18 In each 
case, we would expect these arrangements only to be agreed to if the benefits to 
the debtor outweigh the costs—hence riskier firms, which we might expect to 
be  more  prone  to  financial  agency  costs,  would  be  more  likely  to  use  loan 
covenants and security.  
 
In this context, the utility of secured credit is a function of its advantages over 
and  above  contractual  covenants.
19  The  key  to  the  difference  lies  in  the 
consequences if the debtor ultimately defaults. As security creates proprietary 
rights, it is ‘self-enforcing’, whereas loan covenants are not. Security also has 
another  difference  from  loan  covenants:  it  allocates  control  (subject  to 
restrictions imposed by insolvency law) over the enforcement process.
20 This 
permits creditors to allocate control over enforcement to those best-placed to 
maximise the value realised, and to deter other creditors from engaging in a 
wasteful ‘race to collect’ when the debtor is in financial difficulty.
21 We would 
therefore expect security to be used by those firms which are riskiest, or about 
which creditors have least information. Risky firms are more likely to default, 
and hence more likely to go into insolvency proceedings. In keeping with these 
predictions,  empirical  studies  from  a  number  of  jurisdictions  establish  that 




On this view, the ability of corporate debtors to grant security has the potential 
to yield social benefits extending beyond the parties to the security agreement 
(that  is,  ‘positive  externalities’).
23  Ex  ante,  by  facilitating  bonding  and 
monitoring activity, security lowers the probability that the debtor will engage 
in wealth-reducing transactions, and helps to reduce the probability of default.   5 
This increases the value of all creditors’ claims. Ex post, by facilitating efficient 
enforcement, it can increase the overall ‘size of the pie’ for distribution.  
 
2.4 Security and redistribution 
A third theoretical explanation for the use of secured credit posits that it is or 
can be a mechanism for the transfer of wealth from one party to another. The 
mechanism for such wealth transfers depends on the presence of so-called ‘non-
adjusting’ creditors: that is, creditors whose decision to extend credit does not 
fully reflect the increased risk (to them) associated with the fact that the debtor 
has granted security.
24 The intuition is that, all other things being equal, a loan 
made on a secured rather than an unsecured basis will carry with it a lower rate 
of  interest,  reflecting  the  reduction  in  risk  that  the  lender  will  bear. 
Correlatively,  an  unsecured  creditor  is  worse  off  if  his  debtor  has  granted 
security to another creditor. Thus unless unsecured creditors ‘adjust’ the terms 
of their credit to reflect the increased risk it brings for them, a grant of security 
may result in a transfer of wealth—in an expected-value sense—from unsecured 
debtors to the borrower.
25 By borrowing on a secured basis, the debtor obtains a 
lower  interest  rate;  by  failing  to  adjust,  the  ‘cost’  is  borne  by  unsecured 
creditors. 
 
This claim does not necessarily imply that the benefits of security discussed in 
the previous section do not exist.
26 Yet at the very least it implies that, even if 
such benefits exist, the possibility of such wealth transfers will lead debtors to 
take ‘too much’ security.
27 The costs of granting such ‘unnecessary’ security 
will be wasted. Moreover, non-adjusting creditors who thereby end up bearing 
the additional risk may be poorly diversified and so least well-placed to bear 
it.
28  Determining  the  extent  to  which  these  theories  account  for  the  use  of 
secured credit is, however, an empirical question, and so we now turn to the 
empirical literature. 
 
2.5 Empirical studies 
Doubt  has  sometimes  been  cast  on  propositions  made  in  the  theoretical 
literature regarding secured credit about interest rate reductions. Each of the 
theories about security—whether they characterise it as efficiency-enhancing or 
redistributive—posits that a debtor grants security because it receives an interest 
rate  reduction  for  doing  so.  Yet  empirically,  it  appears  that  secured  loans 
granted by banks in the UK, Germany and France are associated with interest 
rates no lower than for unsecured loans.
29 This leads some to question the extent 
to which the theories describe reality.
30 However, it is important to note that the 
theoretical claims about interest rate reductions are made ceteris paribus—that 
is,  all  other  things  being  equal.  Both  the  agency  costs  theory  and  the 
redistribution  theory  predict  that  security  will  tend  to  be  most  valuable  in   6 
relation to more risky borrowers. This means that when comparing secured and 
unsecured  interest  rates,  all  other  things  are  not  likely  to  be  equal.  Riskier 
borrowers would be likely to incur higher interest rates. So both security and 
increased interest rates are associated with riskier borrowers. Because of this 
selection effect, a comparison of interest rates for secured and unsecured loans 
may associate secured loans with higher interest rates. However, the appropriate 
comparison is rather with the terms on which borrowers with similar levels of 
credit risk to those observed to borrow on a secured basis would be offered 
unsecured credit. Studies which have sought explicitly to take this selection 
effect into account have found that borrowing on a secured basis tends to lower 
the cost of credit for debtors.
31  
 
Having  clarified  this  point,  we  may  now  consider  which  of  these  theories 
derives most support from empirical studies of use of secured credit. As we 
have seen, in developed countries, security tends to be granted by firms which 
are at relatively greater risk of default.
32 This is consistent with the predictions 
of both the agency costs and redistribution theories. The benefits of policing a 
debtor so as to reduce their likelihood of default will clearly increase with the 
debtor’s  riskiness.  At  the  same  time,  the  expected  value  of  the  ‘insolvency 
share’ of unsecured creditors, which the critics of security argue it permits to be 
‘sold’ to secured creditors, also increases with the probability of the debtor’s 
default. Evidence on the types of firm that obtain secured credit is therefore 
inconclusive: it could be explained by reference to either, or a combination of 
both, effects. 
 
More specific studies allow us to draw some distinctions between the theories of 
secured credit. A recent study by Yair Listokin sets out to test the redistributive 
theory directly.
33 Listokin examines the capital structures of firms of a type that 
are  likely  to  have  significant  numbers  of  tort  non-adjusting  creditors:  US 
tobacco manufacturers. The redistributive theory would predict that these firms, 
likely to be on the receiving end of mass tort litigation, would be likely to carry 
more secured credit than the average borrower. This is because the tort victims 
are unable to adjust the terms on which they become creditors to reflect their 
subordination to secured claims. As such, tobacco firms ought, if security is 
used to transfer wealth from non-adjusting creditors, to load up with secured 
debt.  Yet  Listokin  finds  the  opposite:  tobacco  companies  actually  use  less 
secured debt than average. This strongly contradicts the redistributive theory.  
Other findings emerge from empirical studies that also tend to contradict the 
redistributive theory and support the agency costs view. Franks and Sussman, in 
a study of relations between UK banks and troubled borrowers, report that the 
presence of a secured corporate loan is correlated with the grant of personal 
guarantees  by  company  directors.
34  Such  guarantees  assist  the  creditor  in   7 
controlling debtor misbehaviour. Mokal argues that their presence also tends to 
contradict the view that security is granted in order to transfer value from non-
adjusting creditors to the debtor.
35 This is because, to the extent that a grant of 
corporate  security  precipitates  a  grant  of  personal  security  by  the  debtor 
company’s directors, the latter incur a cost by granting corporate security.  
 
More generally, it seems unlikely that there are significant numbers of ‘non-
adjusting’  creditors,  at  least  for  firms  outside  the  reach  of  US  mass  tort 
litigation. On the one hand, tort claims sufficient to bankrupt a defendant are 
rare  outside  the  US.
36  On  the  other,  the  interests  of  tort  victims  are  well-
protected  in  the  UK  and  in  some  other  jurisdictions  through  systems  of 
mandatory  insurance  for  the  most  empirically  significant  categories  of  tort 
claim, coupled with statutory provisions that transfer an insolvent company’s 
claim against a liability insurer to the injured party.
37  
 
Those claiming that security is used to transfer wealth typically assume that 
trade creditors’ adjustment is only partial, on the basis that they face relatively 
high information and transaction costs relative to the amount at stake. Yet we 
have seen that security tends to be ubiquitous amongst smaller, younger firms.
38 
A priori, it would be surprising if trade creditors could not use these borrower 
characteristics  as  readily  observable  proxies  for whether  or  not  security  had 
been granted. Moreover, the assumption that trade creditors only adjust to a 
limited  extent  does  not  seem  consistent  with  empirical  data.  Whilst  trade 
creditors do tend to offer the same terms to all ‘borrowers’ (that is, customers 
who purchase on credit),
39 the non-adjustment idea is contradicted by evidence 
that  trade  creditors  tend  to  adjust  the  amount  of  trade  credit  granted  in 
accordance with the debtor’s creditworthiness and the scope for misbehaviour 
by the debtor.
40   
 
Thus, whilst it is possible that some grants of security may be harmful to non-
adjusting creditors, it seems likely that the beneficial aspects of security are 
empirically more significant. 
 
3. Domestic laws and secured credit 
Clearly, the institution of secured credit must be facilitated by a country’s legal 
system in order to function. The essence of the institution is a rule whereby one 
creditor is entitled to claim control and/or priority to payment from an asset as 
regards  an  open-ended  set  of  other  parties.  However,  the  choices  for 
policymakers go far beyond a simple binary choice as to whether or not secured 
credit  should  be  made  available.  Domestic  systems  of  secured  credit  vary 
widely across a number of dimensions, from those granting plenary rights to 
senior  creditors  to  those  keeping  the  institution  in  much  greater  check. The   8 
economic implications of policy choices over four of these dimensions will now 
be considered: (i) the scope of the collateral over which security may be taken; 
(ii)  the  extent  to  which  secured  creditors  are  given  more  rapid  powers  of 
enforcement than unsecured creditors; (iii) the extent to which secured creditors 
are accorded priority over unsecured creditors; and (iv) the manner, and extent 
to which, efforts are made to bring the existence of security to the attention of 
third parties so as to facilitate their adjustment.  
 
In the discussion that follows, we wish to focus on the effects of choices made 
across each dimension individually. In order to elucidate these, the effects of 
each are considered ceteris paribus—that is, ‘all other things being equal’. Of 
course, in the real world, all other things are seldom equal, and so we should be 
very cautious about inferring that simply because in theory or on aggregate a 
particular  change  has  a  propensity  towards  a  particular  effect,  that  this  will 
happen in any given legal system were such a change to be implemented. Most 
importantly, there are likely to be complementarities and substitutions between 
these different dimensions (and across others not discussed), such that national 
regimes  which  have  formally  different  configurations  may  have  functionally 
equivalent impacts on the real economy.
41  
 
It is commonly suggested in comparative discussions that common law systems 
are characteristically more liberal in their treatment of secured creditors’ rights 
than are their civilian counterparts.
42 This receives some support from cross-
country studies that seek to assign numerical values to the strength of creditor 
protection. A study of 129 countries using an index of creditor rights based on 
four  aspects  of  the  treatment  of  secured  creditors  in  insolvency  reports  that 
jurisdictions the authors classify as being in the ‘French civil law’ tradition have 
significantly weaker protection than do those classified as ‘common law’, or 
‘Germanic civil law’.
43 A subsequent study has sought to measure differences 
across  60  different  dimensions  by  which  creditor  rights  may  vary,  in  four 
leading developed jurisdictions: France, Germany, the US and the UK.
44 It also 
reports  that  the  extent  to  which  creditors  are  able  to  take  security  is  more 
restricted  in  France  than  in  the  other  jurisdictions  considered.  Thus  the 
discussion  can  readily  be  interpreted  as  having  implications  for  European 
policymakers.  
 
3.1 Scope of collateral 
Jurisdictions vary in the extent to which they permit security to be granted over 
a debtor’s assets. Particular differences include the treatment of non-possessory 
security and of the availability of a general security interest over the entirety of 
a debtor’s assets.
45 Theoretically, we may predict that the legal facilitation of 
both non-possessory security and general security interests will be associated   9 
with increased availability of debt finance.  
 
The theoretical case for non-possessory security is straightforward. Requiring a 
creditor to take possession of the collateral greatly increases the cost to the 
debtor of granting security, and may impede the debtor’s ability to conduct his 
business:  the  debtor  is  likely  to  have  comparative  advantage,  as  against  the 
creditor,  in  putting his  assets  to  use  in  his business. Thus we  would  expect 
restrictions  on  the  use  of  non-possessory  security  to  impose  a  significant 
constraint  on  the  use  of  secured  credit.  If  security  has  the  benefits  posited 
above,  we  would  anticipate  that  the  introduction  of  non-possessory  security 
would increase the availability of debt finance.  
 
Empirically, the transition economies of Eastern Europe provide an interesting 
‘natural  experiment’  regarding  the  introduction  of  non-possessory  security. 
Whilst in the early 1990s all of these economies made available at least a basic 
security  interest  such  as  a  mortgage  of  land,  many  did  not  permit  non-
possessory security interests. Haselmann, Pistor and Vig examine the impact on 
bank  lending  practices  of  changes  in  the  laws  of  these  countries  relating  to 
secured credit and bankruptcy during the period 1994-2002.
46 They use a simple 
index  of  collateral  involving  three  measures:  whether  land  may  be  taken  as 
security; whether non-possessory security interests are recognised; and whether 
non-possessory security interests must be registered. Haslemann et al report that 
changes  in  collateral  laws—the  introduction  of  non-possessory  security  and 
associated registration mechanisms—are precursors to increases in bank lending 
to firms in the country in question in subsequent years, controlling for a range 
of other factors.
47 Moreover, the impact on bank lending of changes in collateral 
laws is more significant than changes in bankruptcy laws. Complementing this 
finding  about  banks’  lending  decisions,  a  study  by  Safavian  and  Sharma 
examines the impact of such changes on firms’ access to finance.
48 They report 
that  expansions  in  the  scope  of  secured  creditors’  rights  in  27  European 
countries during the period 2002-2005 were associated with increases in the 
amount  of  finance  raised  by  firms.  Facilitating  greater  scope  for  security 
appears therefore to stimulate lending and facilitate access to finance for firms.  
A  second  important  dimension  over  which  secured  credit  regimes  differ 
concerns the availability, or otherwise, of general security interests covering the 
entirety of the debtor’s assets. The theoretical case for such interests depends on 
a demonstration that the way in which security generates benefits depends in 
part upon the identity and lending strategy of the creditor and the scope of the 
collateral. In the discussion that follows, we consider first the case of security 
over specific assets, and secondly, the case of general security over the entirety 
of a debtor’s assets.
49 
   10 
Consider first a security interest in a single asset, or a particular class of assets.
50 
This would be a natural complement for a creditor following an asset-based 
lending strategy. Such a lender relies not upon its predictions about the debtor 
firm’s  creditworthiness,  but  on  the  ability  of  specific  asset  classes  to  cover 
repayment.
51 Such a security interest is therefore most valuable for a financier 
who  has  specialist  knowledge  about  the  asset  class  in  question,  and/or  the 
market(s)  in  which  it  is  sold.  The  lender’s  expertise  would  enable  her  to 
exercise her control rights effectively, and thereby facilitate the monitoring of 
the  debtor’s  use  of  the  collateral  and—should  default  occur—enforcement 
against  it.  Moreover,  the  priority  associated  with  the  security  interest  can 
sharpen the lender’s incentive to do so. As the lender’s priority will be limited 
to the proceeds of sale of these assets, this will focus her attention on the fate of 
that asset, as opposed to that of the debtor company’s business generally.
52 Thus 
a security interest in a particular asset is most usefully granted to a creditor with 
specialist knowledge regarding the asset class in question. It not only allocates 
control rights to the party best placed to exercise them, but also gives the lender 
a powerful incentive to care about how they are exercised.  
 
Now  consider  a  general  ‘floating’  security  interest,  over  the  entirety  of  the 
debtor’s assets. In contrast to asset financiers, the approach generally adopted 
by  banks  is  to  advance  funds  on  the  basis  of  the  debtor’s  general  business 
prospects.  A  bank’s  credit  decision  could  either  be  made  using  publicly 
available  financial  information,  or  could  involve  the  creditor  developing  a 
relationship with the debtor where ‘soft’ information may be gathered on an 
ongoing  basis  to  assist  in  making  decisions  about  further  advances  in  the 
future—so called ‘relationship’ lending.
53  
 
A lender advancing credit on business-based criteria may be expected to invest 
in specialist knowledge about business generally, or—in the case of relationship 
lending—the debtor’s business in particular. Granting a general security interest 
to such a lender can assist in controlling financial agency costs.
54 Where the 
debtor  is  relatively  high-risk—as  is  the  case  with  small  businesses—then  a 
relatively tight control is called for.
55 Giving veto rights to a range of creditors 
will  lead  to  coordination  costs  in  their  decision-making.  In  contrast, 
concentrating  the  decision  rights  in  the  hands  of  a  single,  well-informed, 
creditor (which for simplicity we will call a ‘bank’) may be the most efficient 
way of managing the problem.
56 Financial economists speak of the bank acting 
as a ‘delegated’ monitor on behalf of the other creditors.
57  
 
It might be thought that the priority associated with such a general security 
would weaken the bank’s incentive to invest in gathering information about, and 
monitoring, the debtor’s business.
58 The intuition is that if the bank is a senior   11 
claimant, it will not be sufficiently concerned with monitoring the debtor. This 
intuition is based on two assumptions: (i) that more creditor control is always 
better than less; and (ii) that a junior creditor always has the strongest incentives 
to monitor. However, it may be that neither is reliable.  
 
Creditor control has significant costs as well as benefits. These costs are the 
inverse of the costs of shareholder control. Just as the shareholders have an 
incentive to prefer excess risk; creditors have an incentive to prefer too little 
risk.
59 And just as shareholder’s incentives are misaligned from maximising the 
firm’s  value  when  it  is  financially  distressed,  creditors’  incentives  are 
misaligned from value maximisation when it is solvent. It follows that the more 
financially distressed the debtor’s position, the greater will be the benefits of 
creditor  control,  and  the  lower  the  costs.  Thus  it  makes  sense  to  give  a 
concentrated creditor an incentive to intervene which will become progressively 
greater with the severity of the firm’s financial distress. 
 
However, a junior creditor’s incentive (and ability) to exert control does not 
increase in linear fashion with the financial difficulties of the firm as a whole. 
Rather, a junior creditor’s incentive to intervene begins early, when its claim is 
‘close to the money’. This may result in too much creditor ‘discipline’ for the 
firm.
60 Moreover, if the firm’s financial position deteriorates seriously, a junior 
creditor will find its incentive and ability to intervene will decline, at the very 
point when it is potentially most valuable. Its incentive will be dulled by the fact 
that the marginal benefit of its efforts will now go to creditors ranked above it.
61 
Its ability to influence the debtor by threatening insolvency proceedings will 
weaken.  The  threat  will  cease  to  be  credible  as  the  creditor’s  likelihood  of 
repayment in insolvency diminishes.
62 Thus making bank debt senior may give 
the concentrated creditor an incentive to intervene when it matters most, and the 
ability to exert meaningful control.  
 
That banks, with senior priority status, do in fact exercise this control when the 
debtor is financially distressed, in a way that is beneficial for other creditors, is 
apparent from empirical studies of banks’ orchestration of informal rescues in 
the UK.
63 Franks and Sussman found that the average firm in their sample of 
financially  distressed  borrowers  spent  seven  and  a  half  months  with  banks’ 
Business  Support  Units,  and  that—depending  on  the  bank—somewhere 
between half to three quarters of these firms emerged from the process without 
going  into  formal  insolvency  proceedings.
64  Moreover,  this  is  put  into 
comparative context by a recent study of banks’ recoveries in insolvencies in the 
UK, France and Germany.
65 The authors note that, despite the relatively high 
level of control rights accorded to creditors in the UK, as compared with the 
two other jurisdictions in their study, the incidence of formal insolvencies was   12 
actually lower—and the use of informal ‘workouts’ correspondingly higher—in 
the  UK  than  the  other  two  countries.  They  attribute  this  to,  amongst  other 
things,  the  greater  control  rights  granted  to  UK  lenders  through  the  use  of 
general  security.
66  The  theoretical  claim  that  the  availability  of  general 
security—covering  the  entirety  of  the  debtor’s  assets—will  tend  to  generate 
additional  benefits  over  and  above  specific  security  therefore  seems  to  find 
some empirical support.  
 
To summarise the conclusions of this section: in theory, the facilitation of more 
extensive security—both in terms of the types of assets over which security may 
be granted, and the facilitation of a general wraparound security interest—is 
likely to foster access to credit and assist in reducing default risk for borrowers. 
Empirically,  the  introduction  of  non-possessory  security  is  associated  with 
greater  availability  of  credit.  The  empirical  literature  on  general  security 
interests  suggests  that  they  may  facilitate  out-of-court  restructurings  of 
distressed firms. 
 
3.2 Enforcement of security 
The procedures which must be followed prior to the enforcement of security 
against collateral also vary widely across legal regimes.
67 Intuitively, we might 
expect that the more powerful the enforcement mechanism, the more effective 
security will be as a  means  of controlling debtor misbehaviour, because the 
‘threat value’ of the collateral will increase.
68 Consequentially, we would expect 
stronger enforcement rights to be associated with greater availability of credit, 
less use of collateral for equivalent levels of borrowing, and lower interest rates. 
Empirical support exists for each of these propositions.
69 Most strikingly, in 
their  study  of  the  impact  of  changes  in  secured  creditors’  rights  across  27 
European jurisdictions between 2002 and 2005 on firms’ access to bank loans, 
Safavian and Sharma found that changes in the law had ‘little impact’ in the 




Having considered the case for facilitating enforcement of security generally, it 
is worth turning to a particularly difficult subset of issues—namely the extent to 
which  secured  creditors  are  permitted  to  enforce  in  the  insolvency  of  the 
debtor.
71 The first point to note in this regard is that granting secured creditors 
plenary enforcement rights in insolvency creates a potential problem. If there 
are multiple secured creditors, each having taken collateral over a particular 
asset or group of assets, then their simultaneous enforcement will lead to the 
dismemberment  of  the  debtor’s  business,  and  loss  of  any  ‘going  concern’ 
surplus.
72 That is, where the firm’s assets may be worth more as a going concern 
than if broken up and sold separately, then the seizure of particular assets by   13 
secured creditors will result in a loss of overall value ex post. For this reason, it 
may be desirable to stay the enforcement of security on the debtor’s insolvency, 
through a moratorium or ‘automatic stay’.  
 
It  is,  however,  important  to  understand  the  limits  to  the  previous  point’s 
implications. First, it only provides a rationale for staying the enforcement of 
security insofar as there is in fact a going concern surplus to be realised. In 
many cases of business insolvency, the firm is ‘economically distressed’—that 
is, its assets are worth more in some other use.
73 Under such circumstances, 
there will be no necessary synergies to liquidating the firm’s assets together, as 
opposed  to  piecemeal.  Staying  secured  creditors  will  not  lead  to  higher 
realisations for the firm’s assets. It will, however, impose delay costs on secured 
creditors, and hence a net social loss. To be sure, it may not be apparent at the 
commencement  of  insolvency  proceedings  whether  a  going  concern  exists. 
Under such uncertainty, it may make sense to have a presumptive stay, which 
can be waived in cases where it becomes clear that there is no going concern 
surplus  generally,  or  that  a  particular  asset  in  which  security  subsists  is 
unnecessary to the successful continuation of the firm’s business.
74 
 
Secondly, concerns about dismemberment of the debtor’s business by secured 
creditors do not extend to the enforcement of general floating security interests 
over the entirety of the debtor’s assets.
75 This is because the enforcement of 
such a security interest can involve the sale of all of the debtor’s assets, either 
together  as  a  going  concern,  or  broken  up  on  a  piecemeal  basis,  as  is 
appropriate. This mode of enforcement was, until recently, permitted in the UK 
for the holder of a floating charge covering all, or substantially all, of the debtor 




However, a different problem arises where a single creditor enforces a general 
hypothecation. This does not so much concern the possible dismemberment of 
the business, but rather that giving control over the realisation of the assets to a 
creditor with a senior priority position might result in them applying less effort 
in realising them than might be optimal. This might happen where the value of 
the company’s assets is greater than the amount owing to the secured creditor. 
Under such circumstances, the creditor lacks an incentive to expend effort on 
realising the assets for more than the amount of the secured claim. This would 
reduce  recoveries  for  unsecured  creditors  and  potentially  lead  to  the 
inappropriate closure of good firms.
77  
 
Theoretical literature has debated how great a problem this ‘perverse incentive’ 
problem actually is. To be sure, if the secured creditor is not in fact oversecured,   14 
then it is the residual claimant in the debtor’s insolvency, and has perfectly 
aligned  incentives  to  carry  out  the  liquidation  of  the  collateral.
78  However, 
concern over possible lost value where the secured creditor was oversecured 
lead  the  UK  government  to  abolish  (prospectively)  the  administrative 
receivership  procedure  from  2003,  and  to  replace  it  with  a  more  collective 
mechanism,  administration.
79  This  places  the  administrator  running  the  case 
under a fiduciary duty to act in the interests of all creditors, and requires him to 
refer his proposals to a vote of the unsecured creditors.
80 However, control by 
unsecured  creditors  may  not  be  a  panacea:  it  brings  with  it  increased 
coordination  costs,  and  reduced  decision-making  efficiency,  because  the 
unsecured creditors are more dispersed and typically less well-informed about 
the debtor company’s business than would be a single secured creditor in a 
relational lending association with a debtor.
81  
 
Two recent empirical studies appear to bear out the idea that control by a single 
secured creditor, who is owed a large proportion of the firm’s outstanding debt, 
does  no  worse  in  generating  recoveries  for  creditors  than  does  control  of  a 
collectivised insolvency process by unsecured creditors. In the first of these, 
Djankov et al study the operation of insolvency procedures around the world, 
which they divide roughly into ‘foreclosure’ procedures (run for the benefit of 
secured  lenders)  and  ‘reorganisation’  procedures  (run  for  the  benefit  of  the 
creditors collectively).
82 They ask practitioners in each jurisdiction to estimate 
likely recoveries for a hypothetical case. The results suggest that, for this set of 
facts,  ‘foreclosure’  procedures  where  general  floating  charge  security  is 
available are in fact more efficient—measured by time, costs, and propensity to 
allocate  the  debtor’s  assets  to  their  highest-valued  use,  than  ‘reorganisation’ 
procedures.
83 The second study, by Armour et al,
84 is an empirical investigation 
of  the  impact  of  the  change  in  UK  insolvency  law  that  replaced  the 
administrative receivership procedure with the more collective administration. 
The authors find that whilst overall realisations have increased under the new 
procedure—and, in keeping with the criticisms of foreclosure procedures, the 
increase is principally found in cases where the debtor is oversecured—so too 




To  conclude  this  section:  it  appears  desirable  to  permit  secured  creditors  to 
enforce effectively, to the greatest degree possible, outside of insolvency, and 
even  in  insolvency  proceedings  if  there  is  no  going  concern  surplus  to  be 
realised. Even where a going concern surplus exists in insolvency, enforcement 
by  a  single  secured  creditor  may  on  average  achieve  outcomes  that  are  not 
significantly different from a more collectivised process.  
   15 
3.3 Priority and Redistribution 
It is a core feature of security that the secured creditor enjoys a right to priority 
of  payment  from  the  sale  of  the  collateral  on  enforcement.  In  the  debtor’s 
insolvency,  this  right  entitles  the  secured  creditor  to  payment  ahead  of  the 
general  unsecured  creditors.  However,  concerns  about  the  possible 
redistributive features of security discussed in section 2.4 above lead some to 
argue that the claims of secured creditors should be subordinated to the claims 
of certain unsecured creditors.  
 
One suggestion, first proposed by David Leebron, is to prioritise the claims of 
non-adjusting creditors—principally, tort victims—ahead of all other creditors.
86 
This  would  mean  that  the  firm’s  likely  exposure  to  non-adjusting  creditors 
would affect the expected payoffs in default of the firms adjusting creditors. 
Hence these creditors—who do bargain over the terms of their loans—would 
take this likely exposure into account ex ante when negotiating. This would 
encourage the firm to internalise the expected costs of its activities vis-a-vis 
non-adjusting claimants. 
 
A more extensive policy involves a (partial) subordination of secured creditors 
in  favour  of  unsecured  creditors  generally,  on  the  basis  that  distinguishing 
between adjusting and non-adjusting creditors may be difficult to do, and that 
most  unsecured  creditors  are  in  any  event  likely  to  have  made  incomplete 
adjustment to the risk of the debtor’s insolvency.
87 To avoid this amounting to 
the effective abolition of secured credit, the proposal is usually made for some 
limit on the extent to which subordination occurs—for example, that it be a 
effective only with respect to a fixed percentage of the collateral, or only up to a 
fixed ceiling in value, or both. 
 
Clearly, such statutory subordination will tend to reduce the value of secured 
credit to lenders. Yet at the same time such a change may be expected to have a 
positive impact on unsecured creditors, or those groups of unsecured creditors 
which are prioritised. To the extent that such creditors are unable to adjust ex 
ante, this may, as with Leebron’s proposal, be expected to have a positive effect 
on  debtor  firms’  incentives  to  internalise  risk  that  otherwise  might  fall  onto 
unsecured creditors. However, to the extent that unsecured creditors are able to 
adjust their claims ex ante, such ex post redistribution simply reallocates value 
as between two classes of claimant. This may be thought to have two potentially 
undesirable effects. First, it may affect firms’ financing choices, by biasing them 
against the use of particular forms of secured debt. At the margin, unsecured 
debt may become more attractive relative to secured debt. More significantly, 
lenders  may  substitute  asset-based  financing  techniques  involving  true  sales 
(such as factoring or invoice discounting of receivables, or sale-and-leaseback   16 
transactions  with  respect  to  tangible  assets)  for  secured  debt  that  might 
previously have been used. To the extent that certain forms of secured debt may 
yield ‘positive externalities’ for unsecured creditors that these substitutes do not, 
this  may  be  a  retrograde  step.  Secondly,  the  very  process  of  effecting 
redistributive payments will be costly, and if no additional value is created by 
the transfer (as with a transfer from one adjusting creditor to another) then this 
cost is simply a deadweight loss to society.
88 
  
Some light may be shed on these issues by the experience of jurisdictions which 
have enacted such partial priority rules. In Finland, recoveries from security 
interests over circulating assets were, from 1993, subjected to a 40% carve-out 
in favour of unsecured creditors.
89 Bergström et al study the effect of this on 
recoveries and costs in Finnish insolvency proceedings. As might be expected, 
there is an increase in recoveries for unsecured creditors (from, on average, 
0.9%  of  face  value  to  4.0%);
90  contrary  to  some  predictions,  however,  the 
implementation does not appear to have resulted in any increased direct costs in 
insolvency proceedings.
91 As the authors of the study acknowledge, their data 
includes only ex post variables on outcomes in insolvency, and so does not 
permit them to investigate whether or not the change resulted in differences in 
firms’ financial structures. A similar change in priorities was adopted in the UK 
in  2003,  requiring  that  a  proportion  of  the  recoveries  from  floating  charges 
created after this date, known as the ‘prescribed part’, be set aside to satisfy 
unsecured  creditors’  claims.
92  There  is  some  evidence  that  this  may  have 
encouraged  a  substitution  from  floating  charges  to  more  use  of  asset-based 
finance, and that consequently this may be hampering the resolution of financial 
distress  by  increasing  the  number  of  negotiating  parties.
93  More  general 
evidence on the ex ante impact of differences in priority comes from a cross-
sectional study of secured lending in the UK, France, and Germany. The authors 
find  that  in  jurisdictions  where  statutory  re-ordering  of  priorities  occurs, 
creditors  demand  a  higher  ratio  of  collateral  to  loan  value,  and  focus  their 




The following tentative conclusions may be drawn from this section. Ex post 
redistribution can result in increased recoveries for unsecured creditors, and its 
implementation does not appear to generate in significant additional direct costs 
in insolvency proceedings. Where the beneficiaries are non-adjusting creditors, 
this  may  encourage  debtors  to  internalise  the  costs  that  their  activities  may 
impose on such parties. However, such redistribution may also be associated 
with a reduction in the use of any types of secured credit which are subjected to 
subordination. Where it is easy for creditors to substitute into different types of 
financing structure, this may defeat the object of subordination, and may detract   17 
from some of the benefits of having secured credit in a capital structure. That 
said, the effects either way do not appear to be particularly large.  
   
3.4 Informing third parties  
All  jurisdictions  permitting  non-possessory  security  implement  some 
mechanism for bringing the existence of security interests to the attention of 
other creditors.
95 It is common to combine this with rules that deny proprietary 
effect to security interests that are not appropriately publicised. In simple terms, 
the policy goal here might be understood as a desire to minimise the search 
costs  that  subsequent  parties—whether  they  are  adjusting  creditors  or 
purchasers of assets potentially subject to security interests—may need to incur 
in  order  to  determine  the  extent  of  any  security  previously  granted  by  the 
debtor.
96 However, there may be a trade-off to be made between facilitating 
discovery by third parties and permitting customisation and innovation in the 
nature and use of security, as between debtor and creditor.   
 
Broadly speaking, legal systems employ three types of strategy to reduce the 
search  costs  of  subsequent  creditors.
97  The  first  strategy,  historically 
characteristic of civil law regimes, is to limit the varieties of security interest 
which may be granted, and the extent to which they may be customised, to a 
fixed list, or numerus clausus. The idea in this case is that parties operating 
within the system will familiarise themselves with and learn the contents of the 
list, so being aware, at least in general terms, of the types of interest which may 
be used. This understanding can be used to reduce their search routines into a 
list of questions or enquiries specific to the interests on the list.
98 A second 
mechanism,  historically  characteristic  of  common  law  systems’  treatment  of 
non-possessory equitable proprietary rights, is what may be termed ‘selective 
enforcement’.
99 Under this strategy, non-possessory proprietary rights are only 
enforceable  against  third  parties  if  (broadly  speaking)  that  party’s  costs  to 
discover the right’s existence would be lower than the costs the holder of the 
right would incur to publicise the right’s existence. In other words, something 
that may be roughly equated with a ‘least-cost avoider’ analysis is applied to 
determine whether or not such proprietary rights should be effective.
100 In legal 
terms, this is the application of a (contextual) ‘constructive notice’ rule: the 
third  party  may  succeed  in  trumping  the  holder  of  the  non-possessory 
proprietary right if they are unable to discover at low cost that an asset is subject 
to such a right. 
 
A  third  technique,  now  employed  in  many  jurisdictions,  is  to  require  those 
taking security interests to publicise their existence through inclusion on some 
variety of public register.
101 Here the search costs of creditors are reduced by 
examining  the  register  to  determine  the  existence  of  security  interests.  The   18 
extent to which this is effective depends, however, on the technology employed 
to  disseminate  information  on  the  register.  Historically,  the  transaction  costs 
associated with the use of public registers were very high, and so the numerus 
clausus  and  selective  enforcement  strategies  were  realistic  alternatives. 
However, the advent of the internet has greatly reduced the costs involved in 
updating and searching registers, giving this strategy a clear advantage, at least 
in theory, over the others. 
 
The choice of publicity strategy affects more than third parties’ search costs. 
Each of these strategies also has some degree of impact on the extent to which 
debtors  and  creditors  may  customise  or  innovate  over  aspects  of  security 
interests. Under a numerus clausus regime, for example, new types of security 
interest  cannot  readily  be  countenanced.  In  contrast,  selective  enforcement 
allows for much greater innovation in financial contracts, although it requires 
greater  judicial  engagement  with  specific  facts.
102  Under  a  selective 
enforcement regime, the contours of a security interest can in principle vary 
according to how debtor and creditor find it to their mutual advantage to arrange 
things: however, this will only bind third parties to the extent that they are able 
to discover the terms at low cost.  
 
Turning to the registration strategy, the impact on customisation and innovation 
depends  on  the  particular  way  in  which  the  system  operates.  Some  are 
structured  so  as  to  specify  a  list  of  types  of  security  interest  that  must  be 
registered, and the details which must be included in the public notice. We may 
term this a ‘specific’ registration system. An example of this type of approach is 
found in the UK’s companies legislation, which sets out a list of different types 
of security that are registrable, and specifies the type of information that must 
be disclosed.
103 Others apply a more general test, utilising a functional or open-
ended definition of what counts as a registrable security interest, and impose 
minimal obligations concerning the content of disclosure. We may term this a 
‘generic’  registration  system. Article  9  of  the  Uniform  Commercial  Code  is 
perhaps the best-known example of such a system. This applies to any ‘security 
interest’ falling within an open-ended functional test,
104 and requires very little 
in the way of notification other than the names of the parties.
105  
 
As between the two, it will be seen that the more specific the determination of 
which types of security are registrable and what must be registered, the lesser 
innovation  as  regards  the  scope  and  terms  of  the  security  interest  may  be 
permissible. That is, having a fixed list of registrable securities is akin to a form 
of  the  numerus  clausus  principle,  and  tends  to  focus  attention  on  the 
characteristics  of  particular  types  of  security;  whereas  a  generic  test,  by 
avoiding  this,  permits  greater  customisation  and  innovation  in  the  form  of   19 
security  arrangements.  This  may  be  thought  to  come  at  the  price  of  higher 
search  costs  for third  parties: a  generic  registration  system  does  not specify 
particular details that must be registered in relation to a security interest, and 
hence requires third parties not only to consult the register, but also to seek 
warranties from the debtor or to consult the secured creditor as to the scope and 
nature of the security. However, the benefit of a specific registration system, in 
terms  of  third  party  search  costs,  may  be  illusory.  This  is  because  even  a 
specific registration system is unlikely to provide all details that subsequent 
lenders wish to know, hence necessitating them to consult the secured creditor 
in  any  event.  Under  such  circumstances,  the  costs  associated  with  the 
transmission of the specific registration information may be wasted.  
 
It can be seen that the choice of mechanism for disseminating information about 
the existence of security interests has implications not only for the search costs 
of third parties, but also for the ability of lenders and borrowers to customise 
and  innovate  secured  credit  arrangements.  This  latter  ability  may  have 
important benefits for the provision of finance.
106 The literature on this topic is 
relatively underdeveloped compared to many of the other issues discussed, and 
so any conclusions must be tentative. Nevertheless, it seems tolerably clear that 
the  restriction  of  customisation  and  innovation  is a  serious  limitation  of  the 
numerus clausus approach. As between the other mechanisms, both a selective 
enforcement strategy and a generic registration regime are capable of achieving 
a trade-off between customisation and search costs. Of these two, a registration 
regime seems clearly preferable for any kind of pan-European endeavour. This 
is because selective enforcement works best when third parties have relatively 
homogeneous  expectations  regarding  the  dimensions  of  security  interests. 
However, as domestic laws differ widely, such an approach would be better 
avoided at the European level. A generic registration system would notify third 
parties  of  the  identity  of  secured  creditors,  but  not  the  dimensions  of  their 
security, which could be left to private enquiry. 
 
4. Conclusions  
This essay has surveyed the law and economics literature on secured credit, 
with a view to extracting propositions salient to European lawmakers. It seems 
clear that the empirical turn in the law and economics literature means that it is 
able to offer more lessons for European law-making than might previously have 
been imagined. Of the theories that have been advanced to explain the use of 
secured  credit,  the  most  plausible  is  that  it  functions  to  assist  creditors  in 
monitoring debtor behaviour, and in bonding debtors not to misbehave. This 
theory views secured credit as a beneficial social institution. The alternative 
view,  that  security  functions  to  effect  redistribution  from  non-adjusting 
creditors, receives scant support from the empirical literature. The starting point   20 
for  discussion  by  lawmakers  is  therefore  that  security  has  the  potential  to 
generate social benefits, through reducing the default risk of marginal firms. 
 
In theory, the facilitation of more extensive security—both in terms of the types 
of assets over which security may be granted, and the facilitation of a general 
floating  security  interest—is  likely  to  foster  access  to  credit  and  assist  in 
reducing  default  risk  for  borrowers.  Empirically,  the  introduction  of  non-
possessory  security  is  associated  with  greater  availability  of  credit.  The 
empirical literature on general floating security interests suggests that they may 
facilitate out-of-court restructurings of distressed firms. 
 
There is an interaction between the scope of permitted security and the extent of 
secured  creditors’  ability  to  enforce  against  their  collateral:  stronger 
enforcement powers are associated with greater willingness to lend. It appears 
desirable  to  permit  secured  creditors  to  enforce  effectively  even  on  the 
insolvency  of  the  debtor,  in  circumstances  where  there  is  no  going  concern 
surplus to be realised. Even where a going concern surplus exists in insolvency, 
enforcement by a single secured creditor may achieve similar outcomes to a 
more collectivised process.  
 
Finally, there are potentially important, but seldom-analysed, trade-offs between 
the  mechanisms  used  to  facilitate  the  discovery  by  third  parties  of  existing 
security  interests  and  the  extent  to  which  debtors  and  creditors  are  able  to 
customise  and  innovate  regarding  the  terms  of  their  security.  Whilst  our 
understanding of these trade-offs is not yet supported by any empirical work, a 
plausible  a  priori  case  can  be  made  for  reliance  on  a  generic  registration 
mechanism—that is, a system that does not attempt to segment the form of the 
registration obligation according to the type of security interest involved. This is 
likely to be particularly beneficial in circumstances where, as within the EU, the 
parties who may deal with a debtor have heterogeneous expectations as to the 
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